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WORLD POVERTY AND FOOD
INSECURITY
Carmen G. Gonzalez*
Our present global economic order produces a stable pattern of
widespread malnutrition and starvation among the poor, with
some eighteen million persons dying each year from povertyrelated causes, and there are likely to be feasible alternative
regimes that will not produce similarly severe deprivations. If
this is so, the victims of avoidable deprivations are not merely
poor and starving, but impoverished and starved through an
institutional order coercively imposed upon them. There is an
injustice to this economic order, which it would be wrong for its
more affluent participants to perpetuate.1
INTRODUCTION
The suffering of the world’s poor and undernourished is due
not simply to the failure of Western liberal democracies to provide
sufficient economic aid, but to international political and economic
arrangements that systematically benefit the wealthy and
disenfranchise the poor. As Yale philosopher Thomas Pogge
acknowledges in his ground-breaking book on world poverty, the
* Carmen C. Gonzalez, Professor of Law, Seattle University School of
Law. This essay is based on the author’s remarks at the symposium on global
resource scarcity organized by the Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs.
The author would like to thank the organizers of the symposium for facilitating
thought-provoking dialogue on this important topic among legal scholars,
practitioners, government officials, and representatives of industry.
1 THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 182 (2nd ed.
2008).
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deprivation suffered by the world’s most vulnerable populations is
often the direct and foreseeable consequence of an unjust global
institutional order maintained by affluent countries in collusion with
the ruling elites of poor countries.2 We can end poverty and hunger,
Pogge maintains, not simply by financial transfers to poor countries,
but by restructuring the global economic order to “lighten the huge
burdens we impose on the people of those countries.”3
This article examines some of the laws, policies and practices
that perpetuate chronic undernourishment in developing countries
and sets forth key reforms that wealthy countries could enact to
ameliorate global inequities and enhance food security. Consistent
with Pogge’s insights, the objective is to lay bare the underlying
structural causes of food insecurity in order to address the root
causes of the problem and not merely the immediate manifestations.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part I defines food security and
identifies the world’s food insecure populations. Part II discusses the
role of aid, trade, and financial institutions in perpetuating chronic
undernourishment in developing countries. Part III discusses the
challenges to food security posed by climate change, financial
speculation in agricultural commodity markets, biofuels production,
and large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land in developing
countries. Part IV sets forth concrete measures that wealthy
countries can take to reduce poverty and food insecurity.
I. THE CONTOURS OF GLOBAL FOOD INSECURITY
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) defines food security as “physical and economic access to
sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets . . . dietary needs and

See id. at 7-32; see generally Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of
Negative Duties, 19 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 55 (2005).
3 WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 9.
2
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food preferences for an active and healthy life.”4 According to the
FAO’s most recent estimates, 842 million people did not consume
enough calories to meet their dietary energy requirements in 20112013—a figure that represents one out of eight of the world’s
people.5 In addition, an estimated two billion people suffer from
deficiencies of one or more essential micronutrient, and twenty-six
percent of the world’s children are stunted (fail to attain normal
height and weight) as a consequence of undernourishment.6
According to the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, the world’s population (which is currently 7.2 billion7)
is expected to reach 9.6 billion in 2050 and 10.9 million in 2100.8
However, we currently produce sufficient food to feed a global
population of twelve to fourteen billion people.9 Enough food is
available to supply every person on the planet with approximately
2700 calories per day.10

4 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
BASIC
CONCEPTS
OF
FOOD
SECURITY
1
(2008),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al936e/al936e00.pdf.
5 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2013: THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF FOOD
INSECURITY 8 (2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf.
6 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE 2013: FOOD SYSTEMS FOR BETTER NUTRITION ix, 3 (2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3300e/i3300e.pdf.
7 Current World Population, WORLDOMETERS: REAL TIME WORLD
STATISTICS, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ (last visited Apr.
18, 2014).
8 U.N. DEPT. OF SOC. AND ECON. AFF., WORLD POPULATION
PROSPECTS: THE 2012 REVISION, KEY FINDINGS AND ADVANCE TABLES 1 (2013),
http://esa.un.org/wpp/Documentation/pdf/WPP2012_%20KEY%20FINDING
S.pdf.
9 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (UNCTAD), TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT REVIEW 2013, WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE: MAKE
AGRICULTURE TRULY SUSTAINABLE NOW FOR FOOD SECURITY IN A CHANGING
CLIMATE
2
(2013),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2012d3_en.pdf
[hereinafter
WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE].
10 See JEAN ZIEGLER ET AL., THE FIGHT FOR THE RIGHT TO FOOD:
LESSONS LEARNED 3 (2011).
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Food insecurity is caused by poverty rather than food
scarcity.
As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has compellingly
demonstrated, food insecurity is a function of food distribution, not
food production.11 Nearly one billion people experience chronic
undernourishment because they lack the purchasing power to obtain
food on the market, or the land and agricultural inputs to grow the
food they need.12 Thus, contrary to popular misconception,
increasing food production through technological innovation is not
sufficient to address food insecurity. We will not end hunger unless
we redouble our efforts to reduce social and economic inequality.13
In order to properly target policies and programs designed to
combat undernourishment, it is essential to keep in mind that the
planet’s food insecure populations are overwhelmingly rural.
Approximately eighty percent of the world’s chronically
undernourished people are rural dwellers in developing countries
who cultivate at least seventy percent of the world’s food.14 The vast
majority are small farmers who are net food purchasers because they
have been relegated to plots of land that are too small, arid, hilly, or
inadequately irrigated due, in part, to competition for land and water
from large-scale agricultural producers.15 The ranks of the rural

See generally AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON
ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION (1990).
12 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO,
Agriculture and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. LAW 431, 466-70 (2002)
[hereinafter Institutionalizing Inequality] (using Amartya Sen’s framework to explain
household food insecurity).
13 See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Food, Technology and Hunger, 8 L. CULTURE &
THE HUMAN. 1, 9-13 (2012) (dispelling the myth that “heroic technological
interventions” are necessary to increase food production and end world hunger).
14 INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV. (IFAD), RURAL POVERTY REPORT 2011
16 (2011); ACTION GROUP ON EROSION, TECHNOLOGY, AND CONCENTRATION
(ETC GROUP), WHO WILL FEED US? QUESTIONS FOR THE FOOD AND CLIMATE
CRISES 1 (2009),
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/ETC_Who_Will_Feed_U
s.pdf.
15 See Olivier de Schutter, How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three
Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in Farmland, 38(2) J. PEASANT STUDIES 249, 256
(2011)
11
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malnourished also include pastoralists, fisherfolk, and landless
workers (including children) who earn less than subsistence wages.16
The livelihoods of these rural dwellers have been and
continue to be undermined by misguided aid, trade and development
policies, and by large-scale land acquisitions that benefit wealthy
nations and transnational corporations at the expense of the poor.17
They are also threatened by climate change, which will depress food
production in major agricultural regions, increase food prices, and
reduce the productivity of the world’s fisheries.18 Indeed, the most
recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) paints a grim picture of the future, warning that climate
change could result in the breakdown of food systems unless the
world’s governments rapidly end their dependence on fossil fuels.19
The following sections examine the underlying causes of global food
insecurity with an emphasis on their impact on small farmers in
developing countries.

See id. at 256-57.
See Carmen G. Gonzalez, The Global Food Crisis: Law, Policy, and the
Elusive Quest for Justice, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 462, 468-73 (2010)
[hereinafter The Global Food Crisis]; see generally Olivier de Schutter, The Green Rush:
The Global Race for Farmland and the Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 504
(2011) [hereinafter The Green Rush].
18 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC),
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY
FOR POLICYMAKERS 7-8, 16-18 (2014),
http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf.
19 Id. at 12; see generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY
FOR POLICY-MAKERS (2014),
http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-forpolicymakers_approved.pdf (discussing the pressing need for climate change
mitigation); Damian Carrington, IPCC Report: World Must Urgently Switch to Clean
Sources
of
Energy,
GUARDIAN,
Apr.
11,
2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/12/ipcc-report-worldmust-switch-clean-sources-energy.
16
17
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II. THE ROLE OF AID, TRADE, AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In the decades following the Second World War, the United
States and nations of Western Europe provided generous subsidies to
their agricultural producers, and imposed both tariff and non-tariff
import barriers to protect these producers from foreign
competition.20 By contrast, most developing countries taxed the
agricultural sector to finance industrialization.21 The U.S. and
European subsidies and import barriers were generally permissible
under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which generally exempted agriculture from the GATT’s trade
liberalization obligations.22
The agricultural subsidies, along with mechanization and the
application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, resulted in
overproduction and declining food prices in wealthy countries.23 The
United States responded to this crisis of overproduction by disposing
of its surplus food overseas at reduced prices or free of charge as
food aid. Ironically, the sale or delivery of cheap food as aid to
developing countries exacerbated food insecurity by depressing local
food prices and undermining the livelihoods of small farmers.24
Until the debt crisis of the 1980s, developing countries could
insulate their farmers from unfair competition with highly subsidized
food products from the United States and Europe by imposing tariffs
on these products. This policy space was quickly eroded by the loan
conditions imposed by the World Bank and the International
20 See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (19861992) 125, 141, 155-56 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND]; M. Ataman Aksoy, Global Agricultural Trade Policies, in GLOBAL
AGRIC. TRADE POLICIES 37 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin, eds. 2004).
21 See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 20, at 154-57; Aksoy,
supra note 20, at 37.
22 See Institutionalizing Inequality, supra note 12, at 440-46.
23 See generally THE OVERPRODUCTION TRAP IN U.S. AGRICULTURE
(Glenn Johnson & C. Leroy Quance eds., 2011).
24 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition:
Agricultural Trade Policy Through an Environmental Justice Lens, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
345, 361 (2006) [hereinafter Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition].
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Monetary Fund (IMF) in response to the inability of many
developing countries to service the foreign debt. Lured into
borrowing money from commercial banks to finance often ill-advised
development projects, many developing countries found themselves
unable to pay their debts when the oil price shocks of 1973 and 19791980 increased energy costs and sent interest rates skyrocketing.25 To
secure debt relief from the IMF and World Bank, three quarters of
Latin American countries and two-thirds of African countries
acceded to loan conditions that required them to adopt structural
adjustment programs overseen by the IMF and World Bank to
guarantee debt repayment.26
The structural adjustment programs mandated by the IMF
and World Bank created double standards that afflict international
agricultural trade to this day: protectionism in wealthy countries and
open markets in poor countries.27 These structural adjustment
programs required developing countries to adopt a standard package
of neoliberal economic reforms, including lowering tariffs,
eliminating non-tariff import barriers, and slashing government
subsidies to the agricultural sector (such as input subsidies, marketing
assistance, social safety nets, and agricultural research and
education).28 U.S. and European agricultural producers, however,
continued to receive lavish agricultural subsidies from their
governments and benefitted handsomely from the structural
adjustment-induced opening of additional export markets in
developing countries.29
The reduction of support to small farmers in developing
countries, coupled with the elimination of import barriers,
See RICHARD PEET ET AL., UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD
BANK AND WTO 71-75 (2003); SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT:
THE WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS & THE POOR 28-29 (1990)
26 See PEET, supra note 25, at 75.
27 See Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition, supra note 24, at 8.
28 See MICHAEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY:
IMPACTS OF THE IMF & WORLD BANK REFORMS 62-63 (1997); JOHN MADELEY,
HUNGRY FOR TRADE: HOW THE POOR PAY FOR FREE TRADE 77 (2000).
29 See The Global Food Crisis, supra note 17, at 469.
25
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bankrupted small farmers and increased food insecurity by putting
resource-poor local farmers in direct competition with highly
subsidized agricultural producers from Europe and the United
States.30 The influx of cheap imported U.S. and European food
devastated rural livelihoods, depressed food production in developing
countries, and generated a wave of migration to urban slums.31 To
make matters worse, the IMF and World Bank required developing
countries to increase agricultural exports to generate revenue to
service the foreign debt.32 The diversion of land from food
production to cash crop production reduced food self-sufficiency in
developing countries and increased their dependence on food
imports. Far from enhancing foreign exchange earnings with which
to purchase these food imports, the drive to increase cash crop
production “depressed the export earnings of developing countries
by glutting world markets with competing export commodities from
multiple debtor nations.”33
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA) professed to ameliorate the double standards in
global agricultural trade and to “establish a fair and market-oriented
agricultural trading system.”34 The AoA required WTO members to
reduce trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, convert all import
barriers to tariffs (a process known as “tariffication”), and to reduce
these tariffs over time.35
The AoA, however, was riddled with ambiguities that enabled
wealthy countries to continue to subsidize their agricultural producers
while requiring market openness in developing countries.36 Since
most developing countries had already liberalized their markets
pursuant to structural adjustment programs, the impact of the AoA
See id.
See id. at 469-70.
32 See id. at 469.
33 Id. at 469.
34 AoA pmbl. ¶ 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag.pdf.
35 See Institutionalizing Inequality, supra note 12, at 450-56.
36 See id. at 459-68.
30
31
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was to preclude these countries from adopting these subsidies in the
future beyond de minimis levels.37 Agricultural subsidies in the United
States and European Union, however, actually increased in the
aftermath of the AoA.38 First, the baseline against which domestic
subsidy reduction commitments was measured was a period of very
high agricultural subsidies in the United States and Europe, thereby
enabling the United States and the European Union to maintain their
subsidies without running afoul of the AoA.39 Second, the United
States and European Union evaded their subsidy reduction
obligations by re-classifying trade-distorting subsidies (so-called
“amber box” subsidies, which were subject to reduction) as subsidies
that were authorized by the agreement (so-called “blue box” and
“green box” subsidies).40 Finally, export subsidies remained high in
the United States and European Union because these countries
simply used devices not expressly prohibited by the AoA (such as
subsidized credit) to promote export production.41
The AoA requirement with respect to tariffication did not
open up U.S. and E.U. markets for the benefit of developing country
exporters, but did succeed in restricting the ability of developing
countries to raise tariffs when confronted with surges of cheap,
subsidized agricultural products.42 Because the AoA did not specify
how to convert non-tariff import barriers into tariffs, most developed
countries adopted tariffs that were far more import-restrictive than
the non-tariff barriers they replaced—thereby maintaining their
markets relatively closed to developing country exporters.43 By
contrast, most developing countries did not engage in tariffication at
all because they had already eliminated their non-tariff barriers (and
reduced their tariffs) pursuant to IMF/World Bank-mandated
structural adjustment programs.44 While the AoA gave WTO
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

See id. at 479.
See Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition, supra note 24, at 366.
See Institutionalizing Inequality, supra note 12, at 463-64.
See id. at 463-65.
See id. at 462-63.
See id. at 458-61, 476-77.
See id. at 458.
See id. at 476.
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members the right to impose additional tariffs to protect domestic
farmers from unusually low import prices or surges in the volume of
imports (known as “special safeguard measures” or “SSG”), the SSG
was only available to countries that had engaged in tariffication.45
Thus, most developing countries were deprived of an essential tool to
protect food security and rural livelihoods against ruinous surges in
cheap, subsidized food from the United States and European Union.
In sum, while the AoA did not create the double standards in
international agricultural trade that systematically disfavor small
farmers in developing countries, it did reinforce these inequities by
permitting protectionism in wealthy countries while promoting
market openness in poor countries. These double standards have
enabled agricultural producers in the United States and European
Union to destroy the livelihoods of small farmers in developing
countries by dumping agricultural products on world markets at
prices that are lower than the local cost of production.46 Over the
course of a few decades, developing countries that were once net
food exporters have been transformed into net food importers47 and
are now being devastated by soaring food prices.48

See id. at 477.
See Sophia Murphy et al., WTO Agreement on Agriculture: A Decade of
Dumping, INST. FOR AGRIC. TRADE & POL’Y 1 (2005), http://www.unngls.org/orf/cso/cso7/library.pdf.
47 See ACTIONAID, THE IMPACT OF AGRO-EXPORT SURGES IN
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
8
(2008),
http://geoinovace.data.quonia.cz/materialy/ZX501_Globalni_problemy_svetove_
ekonomiky/Setkani_c_2/ActionAid_2008_agro_import.pdf.
48 See generally Naomi Hossain, Richard King & Alexandra Kelbert,
Squeezed: Highlights from Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility, Year 1 Results, INST. OF
DEV. STUDIES & OXFAM (2013), http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/rr-squeezedfood-price-volatility-year-one-230513-summ-en.pdf.
45
46
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III. CLIMATE CHANGE, FINANCIAL SPECULATION, BIOFUELS, AND
THE GLOBAL LAND RUSH
Small farmers in developing countries are currently facing
additional challenges to food security stemming from climate change,
financial speculation in agricultural commodity markets, biofuels
production, and large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land. The
collapse of the housing market in the United States in 2007 resulted
in a shift of speculative investment into agricultural commodities, and
contributed significantly to the 2008 global surge in food prices.49
This influx of speculative investment was set in motion by the
deregulation of Over the Counter (OTC) derivatives following the
passage of the U.S. Commodity Futures Modernization Act in 2000.50
This statute and the subsequent decisions of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission exempted OTC derivatives (including
commodity index funds) from regulatory oversight.51 The failure of
governments to curb speculation in agricultural commodity markets
increases market volatility and poses serious risks to food security.52
Food security is also imperiled by climate change, which will
depress global food production by increasing the severity and
frequency of storms, droughts, and floods; reduce the productivity of

49 See Peter Wahl, The Role of Speculation in the 2008 Food Price Bubble, in
THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE: TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO
TRADE
AND
INVESTMENT
POLICIES
68,
70-71
(2009),
http://in.boell.org/2008/11/28/global-food-challenge-towards-human-right-sapproach-trade-and-investment-policies; see also Federick Kaufman, How Goldman
Sachs Created the Food Crisis, FOREIGN POLICY, Apr. 27, 2011,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/27/how-goldman-sachs-created-the-foodcrisis/.
50 See Olivier de Schutter, Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises:
Regulation to Reduce the Risks of Price Volatility 5 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter Food
Commodities Speculation],
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/Briefing_Note_02_September
_2010_EN.pdf.
51 See id. at 5-6.
52 See Wahl, supra note 49, at 75-76.
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global fisheries; and exacerbate water scarcity.53 Climate change is
projected to diminish agricultural yields by as much as nineteen
percent in Asia, twenty-four percent in Latin America, and twentyeight percent in Africa by 2080.54 Climate change will also hasten the
worldwide loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services vital to food
production.55
Despite their negligible greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the
world’s poorest countries will be disproportionately affected by
climate change as a consequence of their vulnerable geographic
locations, agriculture-based economies, and limited resources for
adaptation and disaster response.56 Poor farmers with limited access
to water and productive land will likely suffer the most severe
consequences.57
Ironically, agriculture is also one of the primary contributors
to climate change—responsible for one third of global anthropogenic
GHG emissions.58 The Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR), a consortium of fifteen agricultural

See Anthony Nyong, Climate Change Impacts in the Developing World:
Implications for Sustainable Development, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL POVERTY:
A BILLION LIVES IN THE BALANCE? 47-51 (Lael Brainard et al. eds., 2009).
54 See WILLIAM R. CLINE, GLOBAL WARMING AND AGRICULTURE:
ESTIMATES BY COUNTRY 79 (2007).
55 See Nyong, supra note 53, at 50-51.
56 See RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
A NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION 35-41 (2004).
57 See FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., CLIMATE CHANGE,
WATER,
AND
FOOD
SECURITY
16
(2011),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2096e/i2096e.pdf.
58 See Natasha Gilbert, One Third of Our Greenhouse Gas Emissions Come from
Agriculture, NATURE, Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.nature.com/news/one-third-ofour-greenhouse-gas-emissions-come-from-agriculture-1.11708; Jessica Bellarby et
al., Cool Farming: Climate Impact of Agriculture and Mitigation Potential, GREENPEACE 16
(2008),
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet2/report/2008/1/cool-farming-full-report.pdf.
53
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research centers across the world, has urged policy-makers to reduce
agriculture’s carbon footprint in order to mitigate climate change.59
Although industrial agriculture is one of the most significant
contributors to climate change, small-scale sustainable agriculture can
enhance climate change mitigation and adaptation.60 Sustainable
agriculture or agroecology incorporates natural pest, nutrient, soil,
and water management technologies into the production process
while reducing reliance on synthetic fertilizers and pesticides.61 It
contributes to climate change mitigation by minimizing fossil fuelbased agricultural inputs and increasing carbon sequestration in
soils.62 It also plays a significant role in climate change adaptation
because it enhances resilience to drought, floods, and pests by
diversifying the variety of crops cultivated and by increasing the soil’s
organic matter and water retention ability.63
There is a growing consensus among scientists and policymakers that a transition to sustainable agriculture is essential if we are
to address the climate crisis and the lack of access to sufficient,
affordable food in developing countries.64 In 2013, the U.N.
59 See generally Sonja J. Vermeulen, Bruce M. Campbell & John S.I.
Ingram, Climate Change and Food Systems, 37 ANN. REV. OF ENV’T & RES. 195 (2012).
60 See WORKING GROUP ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEV., OTHER
WORDS ARE POSSIBLE: HUMAN PROGRESS IN AN AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 40-42
(Nov. 2009), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10022IIED.pdf; INT’L TRADE CENTRE
(UNCAT, WTO), ORGANIC FARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (2007),
https://www.fibl.org/fileadmin/documents/shop/1500-climate-change.pdf.
61 See JULES N. PRETTY, REGENERATING AGRICULTURE: POLICIES AND
PRACTICES FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND SELF-RELIANCE 8-13 (1995).
62 See INT’L TRADE CENTRE, supra note 60, at 7-8.
63 See id.
64 See generally INT’L ASSESSMENT OF AGRIC. KNOWLEDGE, SCI. & TECH.
FOR DEV. (IAASTD), AGRICULTURE AT A CROSSROADS: SYNTHESIS REPORT
(2009),
http://www.unep.org/dewa/agassessment/reports/IAASTD/EN/Agriculture%2
0at%20a%20Crossroads_Synthesis%20Report%20%28English%29.pdf;
U.N.
ENV’T PROGRAMME (UNEP), THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD CRISIS: THE
ENVIRONMENT’S ROLE IN AVERTING FUTURE FOOD CRISES (Christian Nellemann
et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOD CRISIS],
http://www.grida.no/files/publications/FoodCrisis_lores.pdf;
UNCTAD
&
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published a
major report urging a paradigm shift in agriculture—away from
industrial agriculture and toward sustainable, regenerative production
systems that enhance the productivity of small-scale farmers.65 This
report echoes the conclusions of an earlier interdisciplinary
assessment of agriculture conducted by the United Kingdom
Government Office for Science with the participation of scientists
and stakeholders from all over the world.66 The assessment’s
conclusion—simply put—is as follows: “Addressing climate change
and achieving sustainability in the global food system need to be
recognized as dual imperatives. Nothing less is required than a
redesign of the whole global food system to bring sustainability to the
fore.”67
Sustainable agriculture can increase agricultural productivity
in precisely those countries and regions where it has lagged while
protecting the environment and enhancing the livelihoods of small,
resource-poor farmers.68 Sustainable agriculture has produced
significant increases in agricultural yields in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America while enhancing environmental quality, reducing
dependence on external inputs, and protecting the traditional
agroecological knowledge of small farmers and indigenous
communities.69

UNEP, ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA (2008),
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcted200715_en.pdf.
65 See WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE, supra note 9.
66 See GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., THE FUTURE OF FOOD AND FARMING:
CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FOR GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY (2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/288329/11-546-future-of-food-and-farming-report.pdf.
67 Id. at 12 (Box 1.3, no. 2).
68 See WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE, supra note 9, at 34.
69 See generally Olivier de Schutter, U.N. General Assembly Report
Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/16/49
(Dec.
20,
2010),
available
at
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20110308_a-hrc-1649_agroecology_en.pdf; ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA,
supra note 64; Catherine Badgley et al., Organic Agriculture and the Global Food Supply,
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Regrettably, policy-makers in the United States and European
Union have exacerbated global food insecurity by embracing biofuels
to address climate change rather than promoting the transition to
sustainable agriculture—a policy that has driven up food prices and
reduced production of other food crops.70
In addition to
undermining food security, the production of certain biofuels may
result in greater greenhouse emissions than conventional fossil fuels.
Most scientific studies question the net carbon benefits of the vast
majority of biofuels.71 Corn-based ethanol is a particularly egregious
example. In the United States, the GHG emissions required to
produce corn ethanol (including the emissions resulting from

22 RENEWABLE AGRIC. AN FOOD SYS. 86 (2007); Jules Pretty et al., Resource
Conserving Agriculture Increases Yields in Developing Countries, 40 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH.
1114 (2006); INT’L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV. (IFAD), THE ADOPTION OF ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE AMONG SMALL FARMERS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
(2003),
http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/thematic/pl/organic.pdf
; Nicholas Parrott & Terry Marsden, The New Green Revolution: Organic and
Agroecological
Farming
in
the
South,
GREENPEACE
(2002),
http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/MultimediaFiles/Live/FullReport/4526.pdf; Jules
N. Pretty, Reducing Food Poverty by Increasing Sustainability in Developing Countries, 95
AGRIC. ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 217 (2003); Jules N. Pretty & Rachel Hine, The
Promising Spread of Sustainable Agriculture in Asia, 24 NAT. RESOURCES F. 107 (2000);
Jules N. Pretty, Can Sustainable Agriculture Feed Africa? New Evidence on Progress,
Processes and Impacts, 1 ENV’T, DEV. & SUSTAINABILITY 253 (1999).
70 See Philip C. Abbott et al., What’s Driving Food Prices in 2011?, FARM
FOUND.
(2011),
http://www.farmfoundation.org/news/articlefiles/105FoodPrices_web.pdf; Marco Lagi et al., The Food Crises: A Quantitative Model of Food
Prices
Including
Speculators
and
Ethanol
Conversion
(2011),
http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_prices.pdf; FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF
THE U.N., THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKETS 19-21 (2009),
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/i0854e/i0854e.pdf;
Anuradha
Mittal,
UNCTAD, The 2008 Food Price Crisis: Rethinking Food Security Policies, G-24 Discussion
Paper No.29, at 6-8, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS.MDP/G2A/2009/3 (June 2009).
71 See, e.g., Ralph Sims et al., From 1st to 2nd Generation Biofuel Technologies: An
Overview of Current Industry and R&D Activities, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2008),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2nd_Biofuel_Gen.
pdf.
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cultivating corn and processing it into corn starch) actually exceed
fossil fuel emissions by more than ten percent.72
Climate change, the biofuels boom, and rising food prices
have given rise to yet another threat to food security: an explosion of
large-scale land leases or purchases in developing countries on terms
that are generally not beneficial to those who currently live on or use
the land.73 Despite the lack of systemic data regarding these land
transactions, a report by the International Land Coalition, a
consortium of forty grassroots and civil society organizations,
estimates that an area eight times the size of the United Kingdom or
nearly the size of Western Europe was transferred between January
2000 and November 2011.74 Africa appears to be the primary target
of these land acquisitions.
These so-called land grabs have been driven by three primary
actors: 1) corporate investors eager to capitalize on the growing
demand for biofuels; 2) foreign investors speculating on the value of
the land; and 3) middle-income developing countries (such as Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, China, India, and South Korea) seeking to produce
72 See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION
USE OF RESOURCES: ASSESSING BIOFUELS 67-68
(2009),
http://www.unep.fr/scp/rpanel/pdf/Assessing_Biofuels_Full_Report.pdf.
73 See generally Ward Answeeuw et al., Land Rights and the Rush for Land:
Findings of the Global Commercial Pressure on Land Research Project (2012),
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/1205/ILC%20GSR
%20report_ENG.pdf; Lorenzo Cotula et al., Land Grab or Development Opportunity?
Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa (2009),
http://www.ifad.org/pub/land/land_grab.pdf; Alexandra Spieldoch & Sophia
Murphy, Agricultural Land Acquisitions: Implications for Food Security and Poverty
Alleviation, in LAND GRAB? THE RACE FOR THE WORLD’S FARMLAND 39, 39
(Michael
Kugelman
&
Susan
L.
Levenstein
eds.,
2009),
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_090629_Land%20Grab_r
pt.pdf [hereinafter LAND GRAB?].
74 See Answeeuw, supra note 73, at 23; The International Land Coalition
(ILC) has since revised this figure. According to the ILC’s database, the amount of
land transferred or under negotiation is approximately fifty-one million hectares—
far less than the original estimate, but nevertheless significant. See The Online Public
Database on Land Deals, LAND MATRIX, http://landmatrix.org/en/ (last accessed
June 13, 2014).
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food abroad to safeguard access to food supplies in light of food
price volatility on international markets and domestic shortages of
arable land and irrigation water.75
These transactions pose serious risks to resource-poor
farmers in the targeted developing countries, including interference
with local food production; contamination, depletion, or diversion of
local water supplies; and eviction of those whose livelihoods depend
on access to these lands and resources.76 For example, small farmers,
pastoralists, and fisherfolk whose property rights are not recognized
by government officials may be dispossessed by foreign investors or
by local elites eager to sell or lease these lands to foreign investors.77
The displacement of labor-intensive subsistence farming by exportoriented chemical-intensive industrial agriculture may reduce food
availability in the local market, intensify poverty by eliminating rural
jobs, contaminate the local water supply with pesticide and fertilizer
runoff, deplete the land through intensive cultivation, and divert or
exhaust water resources needed by local communities.78
International investment law is deeply implicated in the
threats to food security posed by the global land rush. Absent any
international contracts or treaties, foreign investors would generally
be treated like domestic investors under national law.79 However,
host state government agreements (HGAs) (i.e. contracts between
the foreign investor and the host state) as well as bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) between the host state and the foreign investor will
typically give the foreign investor additional rights and benefits not
75 See Kugelman, LAND GRAB?, supra note 73, at 2; Spieldoch & Murphy,
supra note 73, at 41-42; Answeeuw, supra note 73, at 21.
76 See Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 73, at 43-48.
77 See Raul Q. Montemayor, Overseas Farmland Investments- Boon or Bane for
Farmers in Asia? in LAND GRAB?, supra note 73, at 101-02; The Green Rush, supra note
17, at 537.
78 See Ruth Meinzen & Helena Markelova, LAND GRAB?, supra note 73, at
74; Montemayor, supra note 77, at 102-05; Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 73, at
46-47.
79 See generally Carin Smaller & Howard Mann, A Thirst for Distant Lands:
Foreign Investment in Agricultural Land and Water, INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 14
(2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/thirst_for_distant_lands.pdf.
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guaranteed to the local population, including land and water rights,
tax incentives, and the right to export the agricultural commodities
produced.80 As the World Bank has recognized, deficiencies in the
domestic legislation of many developing countries, combined with
limited enforcement capacity, may jeopardize the rights of local
communities.81 In the absence of strong domestic legislation, the
rights of the foreign investor under the HGAs and BITs will likely
trump those of local stakeholders.82
The HGA will generally establish the legal framework for the
investment, including the price, amount and location of the land,
duration of the purchase or lease, law applicable to the investment,
and dispute resolution mechanism.83 Many HGAs also contain socalled “stabilization” clauses that obligate the host state to
compensate the foreign investor for any economic losses incurred
due to the host state’s modification of the regulatory framework
applicable to the investment.84 This provision essentially “freezes”
the law applicable to the investment, and may discourage host states
from adopting measures to protect human rights and the
environment, such as reallocating water rights to ensure that local
communities have sufficient water for drinking, cooking, bathing,
sanitation and irrigation; restricting food exports at times of critical

See id.
See Klaus Deininger & Derek Byerlee, Rising Global Interest in Farmland:
Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?, THE WORLD BANK 97-98 (2011),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/ESW_Sept7_final_final.
pdf.
82 See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, FOREIGN LAND
PURCHASES FOR AGRICULTURE: WHAT IMPACT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?
2 (Jan. 8, 2010) [hereinafter FOREIGN LAND PURCHASES FOR AGRICULTURE],
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/publications/ib/no8.pdf.
83 See id. at 4.
84 See generally Lorenzo Cotula, Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and
Sustainable Development, OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON INT’L INV. (Mar. 27-28, 2008),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311122.pdf.
80
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food shortages; and enhancing labor and environmental standards as
the country’s regulatory framework evolves.85
BITs between the host state and the investor’s home state
provide additional protections to the foreign investor beyond those
contained in the HGA. Standard BIT requirements include national
treatment; the prohibition against expropriation without
compensation; fair and equitable treatment (also known as
international minimum standards of treatment); the right to export
the products produced; and the investor-state arbitration mechanism,
which authorizes the foreign investor to commence arbitration
against the host state in the event of a breach of the BIT.86 These
provisions may impair the ability of the host state to protect the
human rights of its citizens. For example, the national treatment
requirement obligates the host state to provide no less favorable
treatment to foreign investors than domestic investors “in like
circumstances.”87 If an arbitration tribunal concludes that large-scale
foreign-owned commercial farming operations and small-scale
subsistence farmers are “in like circumstances,” then the host state
may be precluded from providing subsidies or tax preferences to
small-scale producers without making these available to all
agricultural enterprises.88 Furthermore, the fair and equitable
treatment requirement obligates the host state to honor the
“legitimate expectations” that may arise from the HGA or other
government commitments.89 If the HGA is silent on the issue of
water rights, an arbitration tribunal might determine that the
investor’s “legitimate expectation” of water for irrigation overrides
the current or future needs of the local community for potable water,
small-scale farming, and other uses.90 If the host state reallocates
water rights to fulfill the needs of its citizens, the foreign investor
85

See FOREIGN LAND PURCHASES FOR AGRICULTURE, supra note 82, at

86

See Smaller & Mann, supra note 79, at 11-13.
See id. at 11.
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See id. at 12.
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may be entitled to compensation.91 Finally, the right to export
agricultural products could likewise require the host state to
compensate the foreign investor if the host state imposes export
restrictions to address domestic food shortages—even if these export
restrictions are otherwise permissible under international trade law.92
In short, industrialized countries have reinforced the
structural inequities in the global economic order that produce food
insecurity by failing to curb speculation in agricultural commodity
markets, adopting misguided biofuels policy, and imposing
investment agreements that benefit the foreign investor at the
expense of the local population in developing countries. The final
section of this article discusses several steps that the United States
and European Union might take to address these inequities.
IV. RESTRUCTURING AN UNJUST GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER
While a complete list of measures to eliminate food insecurity
in developing countries is beyond the scope of this paper, there are
six key steps that affluent countries can take to relieve the misery that
the global economic order has inflicted on small farmers in
developing countries.
A.

Policy Space for Development in the Agricultural Trade
Regime

Eliminating trade-distorting agricultural subsidies is a
necessary first step toward addressing the double standards in
international agricultural trade that perpetuate food security in
developing countries, but it is not sufficient. Even if the agricultural
subsidies in the United States and European Union are eliminated,
small farmers in developing countries will not be able to compete
with agricultural producers in wealthy and middle-income countries
91
92

See Smaller & Mann, supra note 79, at 16-17.
See FOREIGN LAND PURCHASES FOR AGRICULTURE, supra note 87, at

4.
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whose yields per hectare are higher due to better infrastructure,
mechanization, economies of scale, and access to credit and
technology. In addition, market prices will continue to favor largescale industrial agriculture because markets fail to internalize the
environmental consequences of chemical-intensive, fossil fueldependent agriculture or take into account the environmental
benefits of small-scale sustainable agriculture.
Trade agreements and the policies and programs of the IMF
and World Bank should give developing countries the “policy space”
necessary to re-invest in the agricultural sector after decades of
destruction and neglect. Developing countries should be permitted
to utilize an appropriate combination of subsidies and import barriers
to protect the livelihoods of small farmers, restore and revitalize
domestic food production, and promote sustainable agricultural
practices.
Historically, countries in the early stages of industrialization
have protected their agricultural sectors by using a wide array of
instruments, including non-tariff barriers, subsidies for agricultural
inputs, rural infrastructure projects, subsidized credit, governmentfinanced agricultural research, and state marketing boards to stabilize
prices for both producers and consumers.93 Yet the AoA currently
prohibits most of these policies.
Public food reserves, for example, are an important
mechanism to reduce food price volatility and ensure a secure supply
of food in the event of price shocks or shortages.94 The existing
WTO rules, however, treat the acquisition of food reserves as part of

See Michael Stockbridge, Agricultural Trade Policy in Developing Countries
During
Take-Off,
OXFAM
INT’L
7,
10
(2006),
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/agriculturalpolicy.pdf.
94 See generally Sophia Murphy, Trade and Food Reserves: What role does the
WTO Play?, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY (Sept. 2010),
http://www.iatp.org/files/451_2_107697.pdf; Oxfam, Preparing for Thin Cows: Why
the G20 Should Keep Buffer Stocks on the Agenda (Oxfam Briefing Note, June 21, 2011),
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-preparing-thin-cows-foodreserves-210611-en.pdf.
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trade-distorting domestic support.95 In November 2012, India led an
effort by forty-six developing countries to ease restrictions on public
food reserves under the AoA.96 India’s food reserve program became
the subject of a tense standoff between developed and developing
countries at the December 2013 WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali.
In the end, the WTO negotiators resolved the problem by agreeing to
a four-year “Peace Clause” for existing public stockholding (food
reserve) programs and agreeing to resolve the matter within that
time.97
Instead of resisting the efforts of developing countries to
protect food security, the United States and European Union should
reverse the harm that trade liberalization has wrought by eliminating
the double standards in global agricultural trade and creating a more
enabling institutional environment for the achievement of food
security.
B.

Investment in Sustainable Agriculture in Developing
Countries

Beyond creating policy space for development, it is essential
that industrialized country governments, private philanthropies,
international institutions, and developing country governments redirect resources to the agricultural sector, prioritize domestic food
production, and encourage a transition to sustainable agriculture.
The global food price spike of 2008 did result in greater investment
in agriculture in developing countries, but much of that investment
95 Olivier de Schutter, The World Trade Organization and the Post-Global Food
Crisis Agenda: Putting Food Security First in the International Trade System 9 (Nov. 2011),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/deschutter_2011_e.pdf;
WTO
Ministerial Conference, Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes
(Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013), WT/MIN(13)/38.
96 See Sophia Murphy, Land Grabs and Fragile Food Systems: The Role of
Globalization, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY 9 (Feb. 2013),
http://www.iatp.org/files/2013_02_14_LandGrabsFoodSystem_SM_0.pdf.
97 See Timothy Wise, Battle Won, the War Goes On, BUSINESSWORLD, Jan.
7, 2014, http://www.businessworld.in/news/economy/battle-won-the-war-goeson/1208970/page-1.html; WTO Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, Public
Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, WT/MIN(13)/38 (December 11, 2013).
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was designed to increase agricultural productivity based on
conventional fossil-fuel dependent industrial production. This
emphasis on additional production is misguided in light of the fact
that one-third of the food produced for human consumption is lost
due to inadequate rural infrastructure and access to markets
(primarily in poor countries), or is discarded due to oversupply or
consumer over-reaction to “best-before dates” (primarily in affluent
countries).98 Investments in rural infrastructure in developing
countries (such as roads and storage facilities) could significantly
reduce post-harvest food losses and reduce the pressure that
agricultural production places on land, water, climate and
biodiversity. However, such investments will only improve food
security if they enhance local access to food by boosting the income
and strengthening the livelihoods of small farmers.
As Olivier de Schutter, the former U.N. Special Rapporteur
on the Right to Food observes:
[I]nvestments that increase food production will not
make significant progress in combating hunger and
malnutrition if they do not lead to higher incomes and
improved livelihoods for the poorest—particularly
small-scale farmers in developing countries. And
short-term gains will be offset by long-term losses if
they cause further degradation of ecosystems, thus
threatening the ability to maintain current levels of
production in the future . . . . Pouring money into
agriculture will not be sufficient; the imperative today
is to take steps that facilitate the transition towards a
low-carbon, nature-conserving type of agriculture that
benefits the poorest farmers.99
If we are to address the converging climate and food crises, a
shift to sustainable agroecological practices is indispensable.
98 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., FOOD WASTAGE FOOTPRINT:
IMPACTS
ON
NATURAL
RESOURCES
8-14
(2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3347e/i3347e.pdf.
99 WAKE UP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE, supra note 9, at 34.
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Restriction of Biofuels Expansion

The growing demand for biofuels is one of the primary
drivers of food price increases and rising demand for crops, land, and
water. In addition, most studies conclude that the net carbon
benefits of biofuels are suspect.100 The United States and European
Union have encouraged the development of biofuels industry
through their renewable fuels mandates, and through policies that
subsidize or protect the biofuels industry. It is essential to phase out
the programs that support biofuels expansion. In the United States,
for example, the tax credit for corn-based ethanol expired in 2011,
but the renewable fuels mandate remains in place despite calls from
both industry and environmentalists to modify or repeal it.101 The
European Union attempted to mitigate the negative effects of its
renewable fuels mandate by establishing sustainability criteria for
biofuels that encourage the use of second-generation biofuels, i.e.,
those produced from non-food or waste products.102
This
requirement, however, applies only to transport biofuels (and not
bioliquids for heating and electricity)103 and the verification system to
ensure compliance remains weak.104 In lieu of tinkering with the
details of a failed program, the United States and European Union
should modify their renewable fuels mandates to exclude first
generation biofuels and aggressively promote other forms of
renewable energy.

See Sims et al., supra note 71.
See Robert Pear, After Three Decades, Tax Credit for Ethanol Expires, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/business/energyenvironment/after-three-decades-federal-tax-credit-for-ethanolexpires.html?_r=0&gwh=E51BAEB769468B1B1821D45EC599F04E&gwt=pay;
Evan Halper, A Clash Over Renewable-Fuel Policies, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/27/business/la-fi-biofuels-20130827.
102 See E.U. Renewable Energy Directive (2009), Directive 2009/28/EC,
art. 3 (providing that biofuels produced from wastes and non-food materials shall
count two times for purposes of fulfilling the 2020 E.U. transport target).
103 See id. at art. 21(2).
104 See id. at art. 18 (relying on self-reporting by biofuels producers to
verify compliance, supplemented by independent auditing of the information these
producers submit).
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Regulation of Agricultural Commodity Markets to Restrict
Speculation

Despite the mounting evidence that financial speculation on
agricultural commodity markets is exacerbating food price volatility,
the United States has been slow to regulate the financial services
industry.105 The European Union, by contrast, approved a Financial
Transaction Tax in eleven countries to discourage speculative trading
by taxing stock, bond, and derivative trading, but implementation has
been delayed due to conflicts over major issues (including the scope
of the tax and the distribution of revenues).106
The United States and the European Union should consider
several policy reforms recommended by UNCTAD in a recent
report. These include enhancing transparency in commodity futures
exchanges and over-the-counter markets, taxing financial market
activities
(particularly
high-frequency
trading),
adopting
internationally coordinated measures to restrict or prohibit
commodity trading by financial institutions engaged in hedging their
clients’ transactions, and intervening in commodity markets to
address speculative bubbles.107
E.

Reforming BITs and HGAs

International investment law has facilitated the land grabs
that currently threaten small farmers in the developing world. The
BITs and HGAs among the foreign investor, the host state, and the
105 See Timothy A. Wise & Sophia Murphy, Resolving the Food Crisis:
Assessing Global Policy Reforms Since 2007, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY 301-31
(Jan. 2012), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/ResolvingFoodCrisis.pdf.
106 See Tom Fairless, EU Financial-Transactions Tax Faces More Delays,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Dec.
1,
2013,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023045794045792317303430
28774.
107 UNCTAD, Don’t Blame the Physical Markets: Financialization is the Root
Cause of Oil and Commodity Price Volatility 4 (Policy Brief. No. 25, Sept. 2012),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/presspb2012d1_en.pdf. For additional
proposals on strategies to curb speculation in agricultural commodity markets, see
Food Commodities Speculation, supra note 50, at 6-8.
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home state typically restrict the regulatory authority of host states to
protect the rights and livelihoods of their citizens. As one observer
explains:
These agreements include no obligations for investors
to comply with human rights standards and there are
no mechanisms to regulate investor behavior, nor are
there any means for host states to counterclaim in any
arbitral proceedings brought against them where the
investor has committed, or been complicit in, grave
violations of human rights.108
The United States and European Union can take a leadership
role in addressing these inequities by including in BITs and HGAs
legally binding human rights obligations for investors (enforceable in
both the home state and the host state) as well as targeted provisions
that address the host state’s food security and sustainable
development objectives. An excellent starting point is the Model
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Developed
created by the International Institute for Sustainable Development.109
F.

Moratorium on Land Grabbing

Governments, civil society organizations, and international
institutions such as the World Bank and FAO have proposed a
variety of instruments and approaches to address land grabbing. In
general, these approaches can be grouped into three categories.110
The first approach, favored by the World Bank, seeks to facilitate
these transactions by strengthening property rights, enhancing
transparency and community consultation, and increasing the role of
Penelope Simons, International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of
Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J. OF HUM. RTS. & THE ENV’T
5, 18 (2012).
109 See Howard Mann et al., Model International Agreement on Investment for
Sustainable Development, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2005),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf.
110 See generally Saturnino M. Borras, Jennifer Franco & Chunyu Wang,
The Challenge of Global Governance of Land Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural
Context and Competing Political Views and Strategies, 10 GLOBALIZATION 161 (2013).
108

81

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:2

the state in identifying “idle” or “underutilized” land. The second
approach, favored by many non-governmental organizations,
international development agencies, and community organizations,
sees the land deals as inevitable and favors the development of global
standards and best practices to mitigate the risks and take advantage
of the opportunities. The third approach seeks to stop and roll back
land grabbing on the ground that the large-scale fossil fuel based
industrial agricultural model dispossesses small farmers, degrades the
environment, and exacerbates food insecurity.111 The former U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food has argued that:
[L]arge-scale investments in farmland should only
occur as part of a broad strategy of rural development
aimed at reducing rural poverty, and therefore hunger
and malnutrition. But the ad hoc, case-by-case
examination of various investment projects is not
sufficient to ensure this. . . . Before approving any
such project, a more comprehensive mapping of
existing needs should be undertaken.112
Unfortunately, governments in developing countries are
competing for foreign investment and are often unwilling or unable
to conduct these assessments or to impose restrictions on investors
to generate local employment, protect the environment, and promote
food security. In addition, the land grabs are proceeding rapidly and
with minimal oversight.
Developed and developing countries should collaborate to
impose a moratorium on these land grabs to allow host governments,
home governments, civil society, and international institutions to
develop more effective norms and oversight.

111
112

See id. (describing and analyzing the three approaches).
The Green Rush, supra note 17, at 557.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons described in this article, food insecurity is not
a function of food scarcity, bad weather, or simply bad luck. Food
insecurity is a function of global economic order that systematically
disadvantages poor farmers in developing countries. If we are to
address food insecurity, then we must redouble our efforts to
eliminate poverty. As Thomas Pogge reminds us, many of these
measures do not require significant financial outlays or massive
transfers of resources.113 They simply require that we reform the
laws, practices, and policies that inflict unspeakable suffering on the
world’s most vulnerable populations.
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